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Abstract
Mean-field games have been studied under the assumption of very
large number of players. For such large systems, the basic idea consists
to approximate large games by a stylized game model with a contin-
uum of players. The approach has been shown to be useful in some
applications. However, the stylized game model with continuum of
decision-makers is rarely observed in practice and the approximation
proposed in the asymptotic regime is meaningless for networks with
few entities. In this paper we propose a mean-field framework that is
suitable not only for large systems but also for a small world with few
number of entities. The applicability of the proposed framework is
illustrated through various examples including dynamic auction with
asymmetric valuation distributions, and spiteful bidders.
Keywords: Nonasymptotic, approximation, games with few decision-makers.
1 Introduction
Recently there have been renewed interests in large-scale interaction in sev-
eral research disciplines, with its uses in wireless networks, big data, cyber-
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physical systems, financial markets, intelligent transportation systems, smart
grid, crowd safety, social cloud networks and smarter cities.
In mathematical physics, most of models are analyzed in the asymptotic
regime when the size of the system grows without bounds. As an example,
the McKean-Vlasov model [13, 14, 16] for interacting particles is analyzed
when the number of particles tends to infinity. Such an approach is referred
to as mean field approach. The seminal works of Sznitman [19] in the 1980s
and the more recent work of Kotolenez & Kurtz [18] show that the asymptotic
system provides a good approximation of the finite system in the following
sense: For any tolerance level ǫ > 0 there exists a population size nǫ such
that for any n ≥ nǫ, the error gap between the solution of the infinite system
and the system with size n is at most ǫ.Moreover, the work in [18] shows that
the number nǫ is in order of O
(
log(1
ǫ
) 1
ǫd+2
)
for a class of smooth functions,
where d denotes the dimension of the space. Thus, for n < nǫ this current
theory does not give an approximation that is meaningful.
In queueing theory, the number of customers is usually assumed to be
large or follows a certain distribution with unbounded support (e.g., expo-
nential, Poisson etc) and the buffer size (queue) can be infinite. However,
many applications of interests such as airport boarding queues, supermarket
queues, restaurant queue, iphone/ipad waiting queue involve a finite number
of customers/travelers. Approximation by a continuum of decision-makers
may not reflect the reality. For example the number of clients in the super-
market queue cannot exceed the size of available capacity of markets and
there is a certain distance between the clients to be respected. In other
words, human behaviors are not necessarily like standard fluid dynamics. In
game theory, the rapidly emerging field of mean-field games [4] is addressing
behavioral and algorithmic issues [1] for mathematical models with contin-
uum of players. We refer the reader to [5] for a survey on (asymptotic) mean
field games.
The classical works mentioned above provide rich mathematical founda-
tions and equilibrium concepts in the asymptotic regime, but relatively little
in the way of computational and representational insights that would allow
for few number of players. Most of the mean-field game models consider a
continuum of players, which seems not realistic in terms of most applications
of interests. Below we give some limitations of the asymptotic mean-field
approaches in engineering and in economics:
• In wireless networks, the number of interacting nodes at the same slot
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in the same range is finite and currently the capacity/bandwidth of the
system is limited. Therefore, a mean-field model for infinite capacity
and infinite number of nodes is not plausible. The result of infinite
system may not capture the real system with only few number of nodes.
• In most of the current markets, the number of traders is finite. In
that context it is well known that the Bayesian-Cournot game may
not have an ex-post equilibrium whenever the number of traders is
finite. However, the infinite game with continuum of traders has a
pure (static mean-field) equilibrium. If our prediction is the ”mean-field
equilibrium”, in what sense the (static) mean-field ex-post equilibrium
[30] captures the finite system?
Our primarily goal in this article is to provide a simple and easy to check
condition such that mean-field theory can be used for finite-scale which we
call non-asymptotic mean-field approach. We investigate the nonasymptotic
mean-field under two basic conditions. The first condition is indistinguisha-
bility (or interchangeability) of the payoff functions. The indistinguishability
property is easy to verify. The indistinguishability assumption is implicitly
used in the classical (static) mean-field analysis including the seminal works
of Aumann 1964 [15], Selten 1970 [17], Schmeidler 1973. This assumption is
also implicitly used in the dynamic version of mean-field games by Jovanovic
& Rosenthal 1988[2], Benamou & Brenier 2000 [3] and Lasry & Lions 2007 [4].
The second condition is the (regularity) smoothness of the payoff functions.
The regularity property is relatively easy to check.
Based on these two conditions, we present a simple approximation frame-
work for finite horizon mean-field systems. The framework can be easily
extended to infinite horizon case. The non-asymptotic mean field approach
is based on a simple observation that the many effects of different actions
cancel out when the payoff is indistinguishable. Nevertheless, it can lead
to a significant simplification of mathematical mean-field models in finite
regime. The approach presented here is non-asymptotic and is unrelated to
the mean-field convergence that originates from law of large numbers (and
its generalization to de Finetti-Hewitt-Savage functional mean-field conver-
gence) in large populations. The non-asymptotic mean field approach holds
even when there are only few players in a game, or few nodes in a network.
The idea presented here is inspired from the works in [21, 22, 20] on the
so-called averaging principle. These previous works are limited to static and
one-shot games. Here we use that idea not only for static games but also
3
for dynamic mean-field games. One of the motivations of the asymptotic
mean field game approach is that it may reduce the complexity analysis of
large systems. The present work goes beyond that. We believe that if the
complexity of the infinite system can be reduced easily then, the finite system
can also be studied using a non-asymptotic mean-field approach.
In order to apply the mean-field approach to a system with arbitrary
number of players, we shall exploit more the structure of objective function
and the main assumption of the model which is the indistinguishability prop-
erty, i.e., the performance index is unchanged if one permutes the label of
the players. This is what we will do in this work. The aggregative structure
of the problem and the indistinguishability property of the players are used
to derive an error bound for any number of players. Interestingly, our result
holds not only for large number of players but also for few number of play-
ers. For example, for n = 5 players, there is no systematic way to apply the
theory developed in the previous works [4, 15] but the non-asymptotic mean-
field result presented here could be applied. The non-asymptotic mean-field
result does not impose additional assumptions on the payoff function. We
show that the indistinguishability property provides an accurate error bound
for any system size. We show that the total equilibrium payoff with hetero-
geneous parameters can be approximated by the symmetric payoff where the
symmetry is the respect to the mean of those parameters. These parameters
can be a real number, vector, matrix or a infinite functional. The proof of the
approximation error is essentially based on a Taylor expansion which cancels
out the first order terms due to indistinguishability property.
We provide various examples where non-asymptotic mean-field interac-
tion is required and the indistinguishability property could be exploited more
efficiently. We present of queueing system with only few servers where closed-
form expression of the waiting time is not available and the use of the present
framework gives appropriate bounds. As second main example focuses on
dynamic auctions with asymmetric bidders that can be self-interested, mali-
cious or spiteful. In models of first-price auctions, when bidders are ex ante
heterogeneous, deriving explicit equilibrium bid functions is an open issue.
Due to the boundary-value problem nature of the equilibrium, numerical
methods remain challenging issue. Recent theoretical research concerning
asymmetric auctions have determined some qualitative properties these bid
functions must satisfy when certain conditions are met. Here we propose an
accurate approximation based on non-asymptotic mean field game approach
and examine the relative expected payoffs of bidders and the seller revenue
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(which is indistinguishable) to decide whether the approximate solutions are
consistent with theory.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we
present a mean field system with arbitrary number of interacting entities and
propose a nonasymptotic static mean field framework. In Section 3 we extend
our basic results in a dynamic setup. In Section 4 we present applications
of nonasymptotic mean-field approach to collaborative effort game, approx-
imation of queueing delay performance and computation of error bound of
equilibrium bids in dynamic auction with asymmetric bidders.
We summarize some of the notations in Table 1.
Table 1: Summary of Notations
Symbol Meaning
N set of potential minor players
n cardinality of N
A action space
aj action of player j
rg(a1, . . . , an) global payoff function of the major player
1l{.} indicator function.
m¯
⊗
n = (m¯, . . . , m¯)
τj strategy of player j
Rj,T long-term payoff of player j with horizon [0, T − 1]
2 Mean-field system for arbitrary number of
entities
Consider an interactive system with n + 1 ≥ 2 entities (players) consisting
of n ≥ 1 generic minor players and one major player (called designer). The
major player has a binary decision set. It consists to propose (P ) or not
to propose (P¯ ) a secondary game between the minors, thus its action set is
{P, P¯}. Each of the minor players has to make a decision. Each decision
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variable aj of a minor player j ∈ N := {1, 2, . . . , n} belongs to a Polish1
space A. Each minor player has a payoff function rˆj(a0, a1, . . . , an) ∈ R where
a0 ∈ {P, P¯} is the action of the major player. The major player has its own
payoff function that could be the global performance of the minor players or
another generic payoff. The payoff function of the major player is captured by
a certain function rˆg(a0, a1, . . . , an) ∈ R which we call global payoff function.
The collection {
{0, 1, . . . , n}, {P, P¯},A, rˆg, rˆj
}
,
defines a game in strategic-form (or normal form).
Since the action set of the major player reduces to a binary set, the deci-
sion will be driven by the comparison between rˆg(P, a1, . . . , an) and rg(P¯ , a1, . . . , an).
The payoff rˆg(P, a1, . . . , an) when the continuation game is not proposed can
be fixed a certain constant. Therefore we focus on the analysis of the payoff
rˆg(P, a1, . . . , an) which we denote by rg(a1, . . . , an). Similarly, rˆj(P, a1, . . . , an)
is denoted simply by rj(a1, . . . , an).
2.1 Main Assumptions on the structure of payoff func-
tion
Assumption A0: Indistinguishability. We assume that the global payoff
function is invariant by permuting the index of the minor players, i.e.,
rg(a1, . . . , ai, . . . , aj, . . . , an) =
rg(aπ(1), . . . , aπ(i), . . . , aπ(j), . . . , aπ(n)),
for every permutation π : N −→ N , where N := {1, 2, . . . , n}.
To verify A0, it suffices to check for pairwise interchangeability, i.e., per-
mutation of any two of the coordinates. In mathematics, the indistinguisha-
bility property is sometimes referred as symmetric function, i.e., one whose
value at any n-tuple of arguments is the same as its value at any permutation
of that n−tuple.
Assumption A1: Smoothness. We assume that the objective function
rg is (locally) twice differentiable with the respect to the variables.
1A Polish space E is a Separable topological space E for which there exists a compatible
metric d such that (E, d) is a complete metric space. Here, ”‘separable”’ means has a
countable dense subset.
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It is important to notice that the assumption A0 can be easily checked
by designers, engineers and non-specialists. In practice, A0 will result in
functions that can be expressed in terms of the mean m¯ = 1
n
∑n
j=1 aj, or other
aggregative terms such as 1
n
∑n
j=1 a
2
j ,
1
n
∑n
j=1 φ(aj , m¯) . . . ,
(∏n
j=1 aj
)
, etc.
Assumption A0 is implicitly used in [15, 17, 2, 4].
Our goal is provide a useful approximation and error bound for the global
payoff rg in an equilibrium or in function of the parameters of the game.
2.2 Applicability of the payoff structure
These type of payoff functions have wide range of applications:
In economics and financial markets, the market price (of products, good,
phones, laptops, etc) is influenced by the total demand and total supply.
Examples include
• Public good2 provisioning with total payoff g(m¯).
• Beauty contest games with payoff R− ‖ aj − pm¯ ‖, 0 < p < 1
• Cournot oligopoly model with payoff ajp(
∑n
j′=1
aj′
n
)− c(aj).
In queueing theory, the task completion of data centers or servers is influ-
enced by the mean of how much the other data centers/servers can serve. In
resource sharing problems, the utility/disutility of a player depends on the
demand of the other players. Examples include cost sharing in coalitional
system and capacity and bandwidth sharing in cloud networking. In wireless
networks, the performance of a wireless node is influenced by the interfer-
ence created by the other transmitters. In congestion control, the delay of
a network depends on the aggregate (total) flow and the congestion level of
the links/routes.
2.3 Approximation for static games
Next we provide the basic results that hold for both non-asymptotic and
asymptotic static systems.
Result 1. Assume that A0 and A1 hold. Then, the following results hold:
2Goods are called public if one person’s consumption of them does not preclude con-
sumption by others. Typical examples are television programs and uncongested roads.
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• ∂ajrg(m¯
⊗
n) = ∂a1rg(m¯
⊗
n) where m¯
⊗
n := (m¯, . . . , m¯) and
m¯ =
1
n
n∑
j=1
aj =
∫
b∈A
b
[
1
n
n∑
j=1
δaj
]
(db), (1)
δaj is the Dirac measure concentrated at the point aj,
m =
1
n
n∑
j=1
δaj (2)
• The structure of the payoff function implies that the first order term in
the Taylor expansion is cancelled out.
• The cross-derivatives are independent of the labels: ∂2aiajrg(m¯
⊗
n) =
∂2a1a2rg(m¯
⊗
n)
Note that this theorem can be used for games with continuous action
space as well as for games with discrete action space via mixed extensions.
Examples of games that satisfy A0-A1 includes Prisoner Dilemma, Battle
of Sex, Hawk-Dove, coordination games, anti-coordination games, minority
games, matching pennies, etc.
Proof. The first item is immediately proved by using the indistinguishability
property in the definition of directional derivative. For the second item we
use the first item and the relation (1). The first order derivative term is
n∑
j=1
(aj − m¯)∂ajrg(a) (3)
=
n∑
j=1
(aj − m¯)∂a1rg(a)
= ∂a1rg(a)
[
n∑
j=1
(aj − m¯)
]
= ∂a1rg(a)
[(
n∑
j=1
aj
)
− nm¯
]
= ∂a1rg(a)
[
n∑
j=1
aj −
n∑
j=1
aj
]
= 0. (4)
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The third item uses another exchange of positions between i and j.
Result 2. Suppose that the payoff function rg satisfies the assumptions A0
and A1. Assume that a is in a small neighborhood of the mean vector m¯
⊗
n :=
(m¯, . . . , m¯) i.e., there is a small positive number cm¯,rg which may depend
on m¯ and the function rg such that ‖ (a1, . . . , an) − m¯
⊗
n ‖≤ cm¯,rg then
rg(a)− r¯(m¯) = O
(
‖ a− m¯
⊗
n ‖22
)
, and
‖ rg(a)− r¯(m¯) ‖≤ δc
2
m¯,rg
where r¯(m¯) := rg(m¯, . . . , m¯) = rg(m¯
⊗
n), δ > 0.
The proof of result 2 follows from the following result 3 which gives the
explicit error bound:
Result 3. Assume that A0 − A1 hold. Then, the explicit error bound for
arbitrary number of players is rg(a)− r¯(m¯) is in order of
δm¯,r¯
n∑
j=1
(aj − m¯)
2,
where
δm¯,r¯ = |
n
2(n− 1)
(
−
1
n2
r¯′′(m¯) + ∂2a1a1rg(m¯
⊗
n)
)
|
Proof. Let O2 be the second order error term.
2O2 =
n∑
j,j′=1
(aj − m¯)(aj′ − m¯)∂
2
ajaj′
r(m¯
⊗
n)
=
n∑
j,j′, j 6=j′
(aj − m¯)(aj′ − m¯) ∂
2
ajaj′
r(m¯
⊗
n)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=∂2a1a2r
+
n∑
k=1
(ak − m¯)
2 ∂2akakr︸ ︷︷ ︸
=∂2a1a1r
(5)
= (−∂2a1a2r + ∂
2
a1a1
r)
n∑
k=1
(ak − m¯)
2
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On the other hand, one has
r(m¯
⊗
n + ǫ1l) = r¯(m¯+ ǫ) (6)
This implies that
2O2 = ǫ
2r¯′′ (7)
= n(n− 1)ǫ2(∂2a1a2r) + nǫ
2(∂2a1a1r)
Hence, (∂2a1a2r) =
r¯′′(m¯)−n∂2a1a1r
n(n−1) .
O2 =
1
2
[
−r¯′′(m¯) + n∂2a1a1r
n(n− 1)
+ ∂2a1a1r
] n∑
j=1
(aj − m¯)
2
=
1
2
[
−r¯′′(m¯) + n2∂2a1a1r
n(n− 1)
] n∑
j=1
(aj − m¯)
2
=
n
2(n− 1)
[
−
1
n2
r¯′′(m¯) + ∂2a1a1r
] n∑
j=1
(aj − m¯)
2,
and we get the exact error for arbitrary system size.
Remark 1. In order to compute the error bound, one needs only r¯, and
∂2a1a1rg(m¯
⊗
n). The expression of the function rg(a) is not required for vector
with non-symmetric components. This allows us to provide an approximation
result for unknown payoff function as illustrated in Subsection 4.2.
Remark 2. If r¯′′ is bounded by β and
∑n
j=1(aj−m¯)2
n
≤ σ then
rg(a)− r¯(m¯) ≤
β
2(n− 1)
∑n
j=1(aj − m¯)
2
n
(8)
≤
βσ
2(n− 1)
≤
βǫ2
2(n− 1)
. (9)
In particular, if the finite regime has a solution in a certain sense, that
is ǫ−close to a vector with symmetric component then, the non-asymptotic
mean-field approach provides automatically an O( ǫ
2
2(n−1))−solution for any
number of players n ≥ 2. This is a non-asymptotic result in the sense that it
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holds for all range of system size n ≥ 2. Also, by choosing ǫ = 1
nα
, α ≥ 1 one
gets an error bound in order of 1
2n2α+1
. Note that ǫ can be very small even
if n is not large. For example, with n = 2 players and α = 10, one gets an
error bound in order of 1
222
which is satisfactory in terms of computational
accuracy.
3 Dynamic setup
In this section we provide very useful approximation results for dynamic
interactive systems [31]. We consider a finite horizon with length T ≥ 1.
3.1 Non-asymptotic mean-field optimization
Consider a major player who controls also the action to be dictated to nminor
entities. Assume that the major player aims to achieve a certain goal with
objective function given by the choice variables that the major player dictates
to the minor entities. The objective function is Rg,T (τ) =
∑T−1
t=0 rg(at) where
rg : An → An satisfies assumptions A0 − 1 and at = (a1,t, . . . , an,t) ∈ An is
the choice variable at time t. Let m¯t =
1
n
∑n
j=1 aj,t be the sequence of mean
actions and set r¯T (m¯) =
∑T−1
t=0 r¯(m¯t).
Result 4. An explicit error bound for Rg,T (τ)− r¯T (m¯) with arbitrary number
of minor entities is given by
δT,m¯,r¯ ‖ a− m¯ ‖
2
l2
T
,
where
δT,m¯,r¯ = sup
t∈T
|
n
2(n− 1)
(
−
1
n2
r¯′′(m¯t) + ∂2a1a1rg(m¯
⊗
n
t )
)
|
and l2T = {(xt)t≤T−1 |
∑T−1
t=0 |xt|
2 < +∞}, and ‖a− m¯‖l2
T
=
∑T−1
t=0 |at − m¯t|
2
See Result 5 below for a proof.
3.2 Non-asymptotic mean-field stochastic games
Consider a stochastic game [28, 23] with n minor players and one major
player (designer). Time is discrete. Time space is T = {0, 1, . . . , T − 1}
where T ≥ 1. Each player j has its individual state sj,t, t ∈ T which evolves
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according to a Markovian process. The action space a player depends on its
current space, A(sj,t) ⊂ R. A pure strategy of player j at time t is a mapping
from history Hj,t up to t to the current action space A(sj,t). Denote by
τj = (τj,t)t the strategy of player j. For hj,t ∈ Hj,t, τj,t(hj,t) = aj,t ∈ A(sj,t).
The instantaneous payoff function of player j is r(sj,t, aj,t, mt) where mt is
the state-action distribution, which satisfies the indistinguishability property
with the respect to the other players. We assume that the payoff function r
is smooth.
The long-term payoff of player j is
Rj,T (s0, τ) = E
[
g¯(sT ) +
∑
t∈T
r(sj,t, aj,t, mt) | (sj,0, τj)j∈N
]
where g¯ is the terminal payoff. A strategy profile τ ∗ is a (Nash) equilibrium
if no player can improve her payoff by unilateral deviation, i.e., for every
player j,
Rj,T (s0, τ
∗) = max
τj
Rj,T (s0, τj , τ
∗
−j)
Let Vj,T (s0, τ−j) be the value function of the bidder j , i.e., it is the
supremum, over all possible bidding strategies, of the expectation of the
payoff Rj,T starting from an initial state s0 when the other players strategy
profile is τ−j :
Vj,T (s0, τ−j) = max
τj
[Rj,T (s0, τ) | τ−j, s0].
Taking the expectation over the other players state, the recursive Bellman-
Kolmogorov equation is given by
Vj,t(sj) = supaj
[
r(sj, aj , mt) + Es′jVj,t+1(s
′
j |sj, aj, τ)
]
,
mt+1 ∼ P(.| mt, τt)
sj,t+1 ∼ q(.|sj,t, aj,t, mt, τt) = P(.| sj,t, aj,t, mt, τt)
where q and P define the transition probabilities between the states.
Result 5. Let aj,t(hj,t) = m¯t(hj,t) + ǫγj,t(hj,t), where
γj,t(hj,t) =
aj,t(hj,t)− m¯t(hj,t)
ǫ
,
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m¯t(hj,t) =
1
n
n∑
j′=1
aj′,t(hj′,t),
and
ǫ = max
j
sup
t∈T
sup
hj,t∈Hj,t
‖aj,t(hj,t)− m¯t(hj,t)‖,
Assume the state transition q is continuous. Then the total term payoff
Rg(s0; τ1, . . . , τn) is in order of Rg(s0; m¯, . . . , m¯) +O(ǫ
2) for any n ≥ 2.
Due to the indistinguishability property one can use result 3 to rg at each
time t. Any time t ∈ T , ‖rg(st, at)−rg(st, m¯t)‖ is bounded by δt,m¯t,r¯(st)‖at−
m¯t‖2.
Based on this we derive a bound on the payoff Rg.
Rg(s0; τ1, . . . , τn)− Rg(s0; m¯, . . . , m¯) (10)
= g(sT )− g(s¯T ) +∑
t∈T rg(st, at, mt)− rg(s¯t, a¯t, . . . , a¯t, mt)
= g(sT )− g(s¯T ) +∑
t∈T rg(st, at, mt)− rg(s¯t, mt, . . . , mt, mt)
= g(sT )− g(s¯T ) +
∑
t∈T rg(st, at, mt)− r¯(s¯t, mt)
= g(sT )− g(s¯T ) +
∑
t∈T [ǫ
2
t δ¯t,m¯t,r¯ + o(ǫ
2
t )]. (11)
where s¯T is the final state when the average action a¯t is played by all the
minor players and
δm¯,r¯(st) = |
n
2(n− 1)
(
−
1
n2
r¯′′(m¯) + ∂2a1a1rg(m¯
⊗
n)
)
|
and ǫt = ‖at −mt‖.
Taking the absolute value, one obtains the following inequality:
‖Rg(s0; τ1, . . . , τn)− Rg(s0; m¯, . . . , m¯)‖ (12)
= ‖g¯(sT )− g¯(s¯T )‖+
∑
t∈T [ǫ
2
t |δ¯t,m¯t,r¯|+ o(ǫ
2
t )] (13)
≤ δT +
∑
t∈T [ǫ
2
t δ¯t,m¯t,r¯ + o(ǫ
2
t )] (14)
where δT = ‖g¯(sT )− g¯(s¯T )‖.
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Now, a small changes in the action may change the state, and hence the
term δt,m¯t,r¯(st) is changed. Using the continuity of the state transition q, we
take a uniform bound by considering the supremum: δ¯t,m¯t,r¯ = sups δt,m¯t,r¯(s).
‖Rg(s0; τ1, . . . , τn)− Rg(s0; m¯, . . . , m¯)‖ (15)
≤ δT + [supt δ¯t,m¯t,r¯]
∑
t∈T ǫ
2
t + o(ǫ
2
t ) (16)
For the same state, the error bound is [supt δ¯t,m¯t,r¯]
∑
t∈T ǫ
2
t . Thus, the global
error is bounded by ǫ2
(
supt∈T δ¯t,m¯t,r¯
)
.
Since the above inequality holds for a generic symmetric vector which is
the average action, it is in particular true when evaluated at a symmetric
Nash equilibrium actions (if it exists) of the minor players.3 In that case, we
recursively use the value iteration relation for each minor player Vj,t(sj) =
supaj
[
r(sj , aj, mt) + Es′jVj,t+1(s
′
j |sj, aj , τ)
]
.
Summing up over j at the optimal strategies of the minor players (if any)
yields
Vt(st) = rg(st, a
∗
t , m
∗
t ) + Es′Vt+1(s
′ |st, a∗t , τ
∗).
Applying the local error bound [ǫ2t δ¯t,m¯t,r¯(st) + o(ǫ
2
t )] and iterating T times
gives
Rg(s0; τ
∗
1 , . . . , τ
∗
n)− Rg(s0; m¯
∗, . . . , m¯∗) = O(ǫ2).
4 Applications
4.1 Collaborative effort
Consider n players. Each player can choose an action in the closed interval
[0, 1]. The geometric aggregate given by
(∏n
j′=1 aj′
) 1
n
= e
1
n
∑n
j′=1
ln(aj′ ) over
[0, 1]n. In order to preserve the differentiability at the origin we consider the
payoff as rj(a) =
∏n
j′=1 aj′. Then, the following statements hold:
• We observe that the payoff functions are indistinguishable. The payoff
functions satisfy rj(a) = ri(a) = r(a) =
(∏n
j′=1 aj′
)
, which remains
the same by interchanging the indexes.
3The existence of symmetric equilibria in symmetric stochastic games uses standard
point fixed existence condition.
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• The pure strategies 0−effort and 1−effort are equilibria. Moreover, 1
is a strong-equilibrium (resilience to any deviation of any size k > 1).
Indeed,
If all the players do the maximum effort, i.e., aj = 1, then every player
receives the maximum payoff rj = 1 and no player has incentive to
deviate. This is clearly a pure Nash equilibrium. Suppose now that
a subset of players (a coalition) deviates and jointly chooses an action
that is different than (1, . . . , 1), then the payoff of all the players is
lower than 1. In particular, the members of the coalition gets a lower
payoff than 1. Since this analysis holds for any coalition of any size,
the action profile (1, . . . , 1) is a Strong Nash equilibrium.
• We define the analogue of the price of anarchy (PoA) for payoff-maximization
problem as the ratio between the worse equilibrium payoff and the so-
cial optimum. If one of the players does 0−effort (no effort) then the
payoff of every player will be zero and no player can improve its pay-
off by unilateral deviation. This means that (0, . . . , 0) is a pure Nash
equilibrium. Note that the equilibrium payoff at this equilibrium is the
lowest possible payoff that a player can receive, i.e., (0, . . . , 0) is the
worse equilibrium in terms of payoffs. Hence, PoA = 0 and the ratio
between the global optimum and the equilibrium payoff is 1
0
, which is
infinite.
Clearly, the price of stability (the ratio between the best equilibrium
payoff and the social optimum) is PoS = 1.
• We say that a pure symmetric strategy a∗ is an evolutionarily stable
strategy [29] if it is resilient by small perturbation as follows: For every
a 6= a∗, there exists an ǫa > 0 such that
r((1−ǫ)a∗+ǫa, . . . , (1−ǫ)a∗+ǫa, a∗, (1−ǫ)a∗+ǫa, . . . , (1−ǫ)a∗+ǫa) >
r((1− ǫ)a∗ + ǫa, . . . , (1− ǫ)a∗+ ǫa, a, (1− ǫ)a∗ + ǫa, . . . , (1− ǫ)a∗+ ǫa)
for all ǫ ∈ (0, ǫa).
We now show that the pure strategy 0−effort (i.e., the action profile
(0, . . . , 0)) is not an Evolutionarily Stable Strategy. Indeed, if a∗ = 0,
the left hand side of the above inequality is 0 which is not strictly
greater than a(ǫa)n−1 > 0.
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The non-asymptotic mean-field approach allows us to link the geometric
mean with the arithmetic mean action. We remark that the geometric mean
as a payoff, satisfies the indistinguishability property and it is smooth in
the positive orthant. Here r¯ is the identity function because when the all
the actions are identical, the geometric mean coincides with the arithmetic
mean. In order to illustrate the error bound in the non-asymptotic mean field
let consider two decision-makers. We expand the payoff for an asymmetric
input level of size ǫ. Let m¯ = a1+a2
2
, γi =
ai−m¯
ǫ
.
r(a1, a2) = a1a2 (17)
= m¯2 + ǫ (γ1 + γ2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
+ǫ2 γ1γ2︸︷︷︸
abs.≤1
. (18)
Here, r¯(x) = x2. Thus, r(a)− r¯(m¯) = r(a)− m¯2 = ǫ2γ1γ2 ≤ ǫ2.
In particular, If a1 = 1 and a2 = (1 − ǫ)
2 < 1. then r = (1 − ǫ)2 and
m¯ = 1− ǫ+ ǫ
2
2
. One has,
m¯2 − r(a) =
ǫ4
4
+ (1− ǫ)ǫ2 < ǫ2.
Now, if a is near zero, i.e., a1 = η and a2 = ǫ + η with η ≤ ǫ/2. then
r(a) = η2 + ǫη and m¯ = η + ǫ
2
. Thus,
m¯2 − r(a) =
ǫ2
4
+ ηǫ ≤
3
4
ǫ2.
The above calculus illustrates that if the system is indistinguishable we
can work directly with the mean of the mean-field with error O(ǫ2) where ǫ
captures the asymmetry level of the system.
Next we illustrate the usefulness of our approximation of waiting time in
a queueing system with multiple servers.
4.2 Queueing mean-field games
Consider n servers and a M/M/n system with arrival λ and service rate of
µi for server i. Assume that the customers are indistinguishable in terms of
performance index. Each customer will be assigned to one of the non-busy
servers with a certain probability, (if any). If not, the customer joins a queue
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and will be in waiting list. Our goal is to investigate the delay, i.e., the
propagation delay and the expected waiting time (WT) in the queue. Let
the expected propagation delay to be dp. Using [6], we determine the waiting
time WT (λ, µi = m¯) in the case of similar service rates µi = m¯. Let ρ =
λ
nm¯
.
The transition rate (continuous time) is given by

k ≥ 1, Rkk = −[(k − 1)m¯+ λ],
Rk,k+1 = λ,
k ≥ 1, Rk,k−1 = (k − 1)m¯,
otherwise Rkj = 0.
The steady states are easily determined by setting Rx = 0.
The probability that all servers are busy is
C =
(
(nρ)n
n!
)(
1
1−ρ
)
∑n−1
k=0
(nρ)k
k!
+
(
(nρ)n
n!
)(
1
1−ρ
) .
Hence, the waiting response time for the symmetric setup WT (λ, µi =
m¯) = C
nm¯−λ .
The computation ofWT (λ, µ1, . . . , µn) in the asymmetric setting is highly
complex and is still not well understood. The question is to know if non-
asymptotic mean field approach can provide a useful approximation of it. To
do so, we check the main assumptions A0 and A1. Clearly WT is regular
(in µ1, . . . , µn for small λ <<
∑n
j=1 µj) and satisfies the indistinguishability
property. Then, using nonasymptotic mean-field approach,
WT (λ, (µi)i) =WT (λ, m¯, . . . , m¯) +O(ǫ
2) (19)
=
C
nm¯− λ
+O(ǫ2) (20)
In Figure 1, we observe the following:
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Figure 1: Simulation with two servers. The x-axis is the time evolution and
the y-axis the queue size.
expected observed
server utilization factor: ρ 0.830 0.650
(proportion of time
each server is busy)
probability of no customers 0.091 0.150
in the system
probability that an arriving 0.760 0.460
customer has to wait
average number of customers 3.800 0.810
in the queue
average number of customers 5.500 2.100
in the system
including the queue
4.3 Auction with asymmetric bidders
4.3.1 Static setup
The theory of auctions as games of incomplete information originated in 1961
in the work of Vickrey. A seller has an object to sell. She adopted a first-price
auction rule. Consider a first-price auction with asymmetric bidders. There
are n ≥ 2 bidders for the object. Each bidder independently submit a single
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bid without seeing the others’ bids. If there is only one bidder with the high-
est bid, the object is sold to the bidder with biggest bid. The winner pays her
bid, that is, the price is the highest (or first price bid). If there is more than
one bidder, the object goes to each of these bidders with equal probability.
The bidder vj has a valuation of the object. The random variable v˜j has
a C1−cumulative distribution function with support [v, v¯] where v < v¯. A
strategy of bidder j is a mapping from valuation to a bid space: vj 7−→ bj(vj).
The risk-neutral payoff of bidder j is (vj − b)P (maxj′ 6=j bj′(v˜j′) < b) . Using
the independence of the valuation v˜j′, the risk-neutral payoff can written as
(vj − b)
∏
j′ 6=j Fj′(b
−1
j′ (b)). The information structure of auction game is as
follows. Each bidder knows its value, bid but not the valuation of the other
bidders. Each bidder knows the valuation cumulative distribution of the
others. The structure of the game is common knowledge. We are interested
in the equilibria, equilibrium payoffs and revenue of the seller. Existence of
equilibrium of auction games have been widely studied ([7, 8, 9]).
Clearly, no bidder would bid an amount that is greater than her value
because of negative payoff. By fixing the bidding strategy of the others one
has attempted to compute the best response correspondence. Any increase
in the bid will decrease the gain but increase the probability of winning. This
is a sort of tradeoff between the profit and the probability of winning.
We differentiate the function b −→ (vj − b)
∏
j′ 6=j Fj′(b
−1
j′ (b)).
In order to find an equilibrium one needs to solve n Ordinary Differential
Equations (ODEs) with boundary conditions.
v′j(b) =
Fj(vj(b))
F ′j(vj(b))
[
1
n− 1
n∑
j′=1
1
vj′(b)− b
−
1
vj(b)− b
]
(21)
vj(b) = v, vj(b¯) = v¯ (22)
The inverse of the function v is the optimal strategy b. There is no need to
mention that this is intractable even with small number of bidders. Even
for three bidders we do not understand clearly how the solutions behave in
function of Fj .
Why this is not a simple ODE problem?
Non-standard existence theorem is needed: We cannot apply the
standard local existence and uniqueness theorem to the ODE with initial
value (lowest bid) vj(b) = v because by the right-hand-side terms
1
vj(b)−b in
19
the ODEs are unbounded at v. In addition, the equilibrium satisfies vj(b¯) = v¯
but the term b¯ is unknown. Due to these difficulties, explicit solutions of (21)
and (22) are not available.
Non-standard numerical method is needed:
Since explicit solutions are open issues, one may ask if it is possible to
solve the problem numerically. According to the recent work in [21], the nu-
merical implementation of the system (21) , (22) remains a challenging task.
One of the well-known numerical methods consists to solve to find among
the solutions of ODEs together with the initial conditions, that satisfy the
highest equilibrium bid constraint. Such an approach is known as forward-
shooting method. However, the forward-shooting method of Marshall et al.
[24] do not converge to the solution due to approximation near b, with the
derivative v′j(b) It has been shown in [21] that for the special case of power
law (i.e. F (v) = vα), a dynamical system approach can be used with the
change of variable
vj(b) = bVj(b), b = e
w,
In the backward approach, one searches for the value of b¯ by solving Equa-
tion (21) backward in b subject to the end condition vj(b¯) = v¯ and looking
for the value of b¯ for which the initial value coincides with v. However, the
standard backward-shooting method is inherently unstable, specially when
the bids are near v. The authors in [25] showed that the backward-shooting
method is unstable even in the symmetric case.
If all the functions Fj(v) are the same, and hence equal to m¯(v) then, we
know from Vickrey 1961 that the symmetric equilibrium is
b(s) = s−
∫ s
v
F n−1(x)dx
F n−1(s)
,
which is obtained as follows:
Instead of n ODEs we have one ODE to solve. The ODE is
v′(b)(v(b)− b) =
G(v(b))
G′(v(b))
(23)
where G the value distribution of the n − 1 bidders. Using the bijection
function and the fact that (h−1)′(x) = 1
h′(h−1(x))
Hence, 1
h′(x)
(x−h(x))G′(x) =
G(x) where h(x) is the strategy. This means that xG′ = h′G+ hG′ = (hG)′.
By simple integration between the minimum value and v, one gets
h(v)G(v)− [hG]v =
∫ v
v
xG′(x)dx = [xG(x)]vv −
∫ v
v
G(x) dx
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Hence, h(v) = v − 1
G(v)
∫ v
v
G(x) dx
Nonasymptotic mean field approach provides a useful error bound in this
open problem
For asymmetric distribution we are able to get a precise error bound
when the distribution Fj are close to their arithmetic mean, the equilibrium
strategies and payoffs can be approximated in a perturbed range. To do
so, we use a non-asymptotic mean field approach over function space. First
remark that the revenue of the seller, satisfies the indistinguishability prop-
erty, since it is, up to a constant, the integral of the product
∏
j∈N Fj . We
rewrite the function Fj as Fj(v) = m¯(v) + ǫγj(v), where γj(v) =
Fj(v)−m¯(v)
ǫ
,
m¯(v) = 1
n
∑n
j′=1 Fj′(v) and ǫ = maxj max[v,v¯] |Fj(v)− m¯(v)|,
Using result 3, one gets
• Good approximate of the asymmetric equilibrium strategies,
• Equilibrium payoff with deviation order of O(ǫ2).
Example 1. Note that the Optional Second Price auction is currently used
in Doubleclick Ad Exchange. Examples of Ad exchanges are RightMedia,
adBrite, OpenX, and DoubleClick. The idea is described as follows [12, 11]:
• User u visits the webpage w of publisher p(w) that has, say, a single
slot for ads.
• Publisher p(w) contacts the exchange E with (w, P (u), ρ) where ρ is the
minimum price p(w) is willing to take for the slot in w, and P (u) is
the information about user u that P (w) shares with E.
• The exchange E contacts ad networks adn1, . . . , adnm with (E(w), E(u)),
where E(w) is information about w provided by E, and E(u) is the in-
formation about u provided by E. E(u) may be potentially different from
P (u).
• Each ad network adnj returns (bj , dj) on behalf of its customers which
are the advertisers; bj is its bid, that is, the maximum it is willing to
pay for the slot in page w and dj is the ad it wishes to be shown. Each
ad network may have multiple advertisers. The ad networks may also
choose not to return a bid.
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• Exchange E determines a winner j∗ for the ad slot among all (bj , dj)′s
and its price cj∗ satisfying ρ ≤ cj∗ ≤ bj∗ via an auction (first or second
price).
• Exchange E returns winning ad dj∗ to publisher p(w) and price cj∗ to
ad network j∗
• The publisher p(w) serves webpage w with ad dj∗ to user u (the impres-
sion of ad dj∗).
Note that from the click of the user to the impression of the ad dj∗, there
are many intermediary interactive processes. Auction is one them and an
important one because it determines the winner ad network. While it is
reasonable to consider large population of users over internet, the number of
concurrent ad networks remains finite and there a room for non-asymptotic
mean-field analysis for the revenue. As a user may click several times over
webpages, the dynamic auction framework seems more realistic. We examine
the dynamic auction in subsection 4.4.1.
4.3.2 Spiteful bidders
A player might be losing the auction of a long-term project. Yet she continues
to participate in the auction because she wants to minimize the negative
payoff on losing by making her competitor, who would win the auction, pay
a high price for the win. This negative dependence of payoff on others’ surplus
is referred to as spiteful behavior. Below we show how our nonasymptotic
mean-field framework can be applied to that scenario.
A spiteful player j maximizes the weighted difference of her own payoff rj
and his competitors’ payoffs rj′ for all j
′ 6= j. The payoff of a spiteful player
is
rj,α := (1− αj)rj − αj
∑
j′ 6=j
rj′ (24)
Obviously, setting αj to zero yields a selfishness (whose payoff equals his
exact profit) whereas αj = 1 defines a completely malicious player (jammer)
whose only goal is to minimize the profit of other players. Note that for
altruistic player we would be considering a payoff in the form rj,α = (1 −
αj)rj + αj
∑
j′ 6=j rj′.
22
The payoff of a spiteful player j is
rj,α = (1− αj)(vj − bj)
∏
j′ 6=j
Fj′(vj′(bj))
−αjE
[
max
j′ 6=j
vj′| max
j′ 6=j
bj′ > bj(vj)
]
+αjE
[
max
j′ 6=j
bj′| max
j′ 6=j
bj′ > bj(vj)
]
(25)
As mentioned above the main difficulty is that the private values distri-
bution are asymmetric. Denote that by b∗j,α(v) the equilibrium bid strategy.
Even when bidders are selfish (∀j, αj = 0), the above analysis shows that
the explicit expression of b∗j,0(v) is NOT a trivial task. However, for symmet-
ric type distribution, and symmetric coefficient αj = α, the payoff function
reduces to
rj,α = (1− α)(vj − b)F
n−1(v)− α
∫ v¯
vj
s(n− 1)F n−2(s)f(s)ds
−α
∫ bj(v¯)
bj(vj)
(n− 1)sF n−1(v(s))f(v(s))v′(s)ds
Using the fact that the derivative of
∫ v¯
v(b)
h(s) ds with the respect to b is
given by −h(v(b))v′(b). The first order optimality condition yields to
b(v) = v −
(1− α)F (v)
(n− 1)f(v)
b′(v).
In particular for uniform distribution Fj(v) = v over [0, 1] the Bayes Nash
equilibrium strategy for spiteful player satisfies the ODE:
bα(v) = v[1−
(1− α)
(n− 1)
b′(v)].
It is easy to check that b(v) = n−1
n−αv is a solution of the above ODE. The
symmetric equilibrium is increasing and convex with α. We now evaluate the
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revenue of the seller in equilibrium for Fj(v) = m¯(v) = v.
Rα(m¯, m¯)) = E[max
j
bj(vj)] (26)
=
∫
b(v)nF n−1(v)f ′(v)dv (27)
=
∫
n(
(n− 1)
(n− α)
v)vn−1 dv
=
n(n− 1)
(n− α)(n+ 1)
Now we compare the revenue with Rα(F1, F2) where
F1(v) = m¯(v)− ǫv(1− v)(
1
2
− v)
and
F2(v) = m¯(v) + ǫv(1− v)(
1
2
− v)
Rα(F1, F2) = Rα(m¯, m¯) +O(ǫ
2).
4.4 Fast algorithm for computing approximate equi-
librium
We construct a fast algorithm for computing approximate equilibrium. Recall
that the first optimality equation can be written as
1 + (b− vj(b))
∑
j′ 6=j
F ′j′(vj′(b))
Fj′(vj′(b))
v′j′(b) = 0
Define the functional Hj(b¯, v) = 1 + (b− vj(b))
∑
j′ 6=j
F ′
j′
(vj′ (b))
Fj′ (vj′ (b))
v′j′(b).
We consider polynomial expansion of inverse-bid functions. The function
vj is written in a flexible functional form vj(b) = b¯−
∑+∞
k=0 µj,k(b¯− b)
k.
We truncate this polynomial to order K ≥ 2 and replace it in the first
order optimality equation. Denote vˆj,K(b) = b¯−
∑K
k=0 µj,k(b¯− b)
k. Taking in
account 2n boundary conditions, one gets that
L(b¯, v) =
n∑
j=1
Hj(b¯, v)
2 +
n∑
j=1
(vj(b¯)− v¯)
2 +
n∑
j=1
(vj(b)− v)
2 ≥ 0
24
has a minimum 0 and the minimizer is the equilibrium inverse bid strategy
v. Hence, it is reasonable to consider the functional H when each of function
vˆj,K belongs the subspace DK the set of polynomial with degree at most K.
This is space with dimension K + 1. The problem becomes
inf
(vˆj,K )j∈DK
L(b¯, vˆ) = inf
(µj,k)j,k
L(b¯, vˆ)
Remember that b¯ is the highest bid that is submitted in equilibrium. It
is therefore an unknown. Thus, we add this into the optimization prob-
lem. Hence one has 1 + n(K + 1) unknown variables to find. Using a
grid decomposition of the domain [v, v¯] with T points inside, we arrive at
a nonlinear least-squares algorithm for selecting b¯ and (µj,k)j,k by solving
inf
(ˆ¯bt)t,(µj,k)j,k
∑T
t=1 L(
ˆ¯bt, vˆK), which yields
inf
(ˆ¯bt)t,(µj,k)j,k
T∑
t=1
n∑
j=1
Hj(
ˆ¯bt, vˆK)
2+
T
n∑
j=1
(vˆj,K(b¯t)− v¯)
2 + T
n∑
j=1
(vˆj,K(b)− v)
2
The points ˆ¯bt on a grid will be chosen uniformly spaced, i.e.
ˆ¯bt = b¯ +
t
T
(v − b¯)
Standard Newton-Gauss-Seidel methods provide a very fast convergence
rate to a solution if the initial guess if appropriately chosen. However the
choice of initial data and guess need to be conducted.
We propose a numerical scheme for optimal bidding strategies. First we
solve the initial-value problem that starts at b0 near but not equal to b so that
the denominator do not vanish. ODE starts at b0 > b and moves forward.
We fix the starting function to
v(b0) = v + (b− b0)D1 + δ1D2(b− b0)
1+δ2
whereD1 = (D11, D12) is the limit in b of the derivative, D11 = limb−→b0
v1(b)−v1(b)
b−b ,
D12 = limb−→b0
v2(b)−v2(b)
b−b , , δi are positive constant. and D2 = [D21, D22], is
the equivalent fractional derivative approximation around b, b0 = b+10
− 7
1+δ2
To find the solution we take the intersection v1(b+) = v2(b+) = x The solution
is ( 1
x
v1(bx),
1
x
v2(bx)).
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Figure 2: inverse optimal strategy for the distributions F1(v) = v
7, F2(v) =
v8. The x-axis represents the optimal bidding strategy and the y-axis is the
inverse optimal bidding strategy of the two-players.
Figure 2 represents the inverse optimal bidding strategy for the cumula-
tive distributions F1(v) = v
7, F2(v) = v
8. The x-axis represents the optimal
bidding strategy and the y-axis is the inverse optimal bidding strategy of
the two players. For that case ǫ = 1
8
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. We observe in Figure 2 that the
second curve is around the first one plus 1
64
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)14
.
For n ≥ 2 we do not understand yet the behavior of b∗j,α(v). However,
we are able to provide a useful approximation for asymmetric distribution in
function of their deviation to the mean. Moreover the approximation holds
for the revenue of the seller (auctioneer).
4.4.1 Dynamic auction with asymmetric bidders
We now explain how our framework can be extended in a dynamic setting.
What is the motivation for dynamic auction? Currently a large proportion
of internet users employ search engines to locate information [26]. For ex-
ample, search engines are used to obtain an instantaneous selection of offers
from various providers operating in the cyberspace. Internet auctions, on
the other hand, connect potential sellers and buyers from different locations
in a virtual auction. Buyers also often get multiple purchase opportuni-
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ties over time. This is most obvious in the case of today’s online auction
markets: eBay has auctions for physical goods closing every second, while
Google’s Doubleclick and Microsoft’s Advertising Exchange trade online ad-
vertisements at a much faster rate. This creates the possibility for buyers to
inter-temporally substitute, adjusting their current bids to account for the
option value of waiting for future purchasing opportunities.
In sponsored search auctions, such as those run by Google (AdWords) or
Bing (adCenter), a query to a search engine triggers an auction for positions
on the page returned by the query. Advertisers bid for positions or slots, and
successful bids result in ads being displayed alongside results to the query.
The slots are ordered, where higher slots are more valuable. Under a dynamic
auction mechanism for slots, an agent places a single bid, bids are ranked by
weight and ranked bids determine the slot allocation. If an advert displayed
in a slot is clicked, then the advertiser pays the price to be in the current
slot, a Pay-Per-Click payment model.
In order to capture the practical observation, we model the problem as
dynamic auction between buyers and sellers. We specially focus on the buy-
ers side. Since measurement are done in discrete time unit, we start with
a discrete time model. The work in [26] considered repeated second-price
auctions under homogeneous valuation distributions and budget constraints.
Most auctions involve bidders that are heterogeneous ex ante. For exam-
ple ad networks may not have homogeneous valuation distribution for the
advertisers. Therefore, Here we consider asymmetric distribution as well.
Time space is T = {0, 1, . . . , T − 1} where T is the length of the horizon.
Since budget is limited for the entire day or month, we transform the long-
term budget constraints into an iterative budget state equation for bidder
j :
sj,t+1 = sj,t − c(sj,t, bj,t)1l{bj,t>maxj′ 6=j bj′,t} where sj,t is the remaining bud-
get of bidder j for the corresponding contract frame, c(sj,t, bj,t) is the total
cost for the bid (if winner). The state sj,t is subject to positivity constraint:
sj,t ≥ 0 almost surely. It clearly limits the action space at time t to the set
of bids bj,t such that c(sj,t, bj,t) ≤ sj,t. Let g be the function b 7−→ c(sj,t, b).
The individual state bidder j is the pair (sj,t, vj,t). This generates a stochas-
tic game with Markovian transition. Each bidder maximizes her long-term
payoff given by
Rj,T = E [g¯(sT )
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+
∑
t∈T
(vj,t − bj,t)1l{maxj′ 6=j bj′,t(vj,t)<bj,t(vj,t)}| vj
]
A history of a bidder j is at time t is a collection (sj,t′, vj,t′, bj,t′)t′≤t. A
bidding strategy τj,t of j at time t is a mapping from the history hj,t ∈ Hj,t
to the restricted bid space [b, b¯]
⋂
[0, g−1(sj,t)].
The game is played as follows. At opportunity t ∈ T , every player j,
j ∈ N ,
• realizes his current value vj,t ∈ [v, v¯] distributed according to Fj,t
• submits a bid bj,t = τj,t(vj,t, hj,t), where τj,t : [v, v¯] × Hj,t −→ [b, b¯]
denotes his bidding strategy at auction t;
• updates his information set hj,t+1 ∈ Hj,t+1, based on the results ob-
tained in auction t. Specifically, he forms a set of beliefs about the
distribution of the bidding profile of the players b−j,t+1 distributed ac-
cording to Fj′,t+1, j
′ 6= j.
Let Vj,0(s0, T, τ−j) be the value function of the bidder j , i.e., it is the
supremum, over all possible bidding strategies, of the expectation of the
payoff Rj,T starting from an initial budget s0 when the other bidder strategy
profile is τ−j .
Based on the classical Bellman optimality criterion, we immediately get
the following result. The proof is therefore omitted.
Result 6. Given vj the optimal strategy of a player j satisfies
b∗j,t(vj) ∈ arg max
b≤g−1(sj,t)
Eb¯−j,t
[
(vj − b)1l{b>b¯−j,t}
+1l{b>b¯−j,t}Vj,t+1(sj,t − c(sj,t, b))
+1l{b<b¯−j,t}Vj,t+1 | vj
]
, (28)
where b¯−j,t := maxj′ 6=j bj′,t is the highest bid of the other players than j.
Let x∗1 ∈ argmaxx1∈[b¯−j,t,g−1(sj,t)] [vj − x1 + Vj,t(sj,t − c(sj,t, x1))] .
Let Wj := vj−x∗1+Vj,t(sj,t−c(sj,t, x
∗
1)), Then the optimal bidding strategy
is
b∗j,t(vj) =
{
x∗1 if Wj,t > Vj,t+1(sj,t)
x∗2 ≤ min
(
b¯−j,t, g−1(sj,t)
)
otherwise
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The value iteration is given by
Vj,t(sj,t) = Evj sup
b
Eb¯−j,t
[
(vj − b)1l{b>b¯−j,t}
+1l{b>b¯−j,t}Vj,t+1(sj,t − c(sj,t, b))
+1l{b<b¯−j,t}Vj,t+1(sj,t) | vj
]
(29)
For the symmetric setup we drop the index j.
Result 7 (Symmetric beliefs). Given v the optimal strategy of a generic
player satisfies
b∗t (v) ∈ arg max
b≤g−1(st)
Eb¯t
[
(v − b)1l{b>b¯t}
+1l{b>b¯t}Vt+1(st − c(st, b))
+1l{b<b¯t}Vt+1(st) | v
]
, (30)
where b¯t := maxj′ 6=j bj′,t is the highest bid of the other players than j.
Let x∗1 ∈ argmaxx1∈[b¯t,g−1(st)] [v − x1 + Vt(st − c(st, x1))] . This implies that
the optimal bidding strategy is
b∗t (v) =
{
x∗1 if Wt > Vt+1(st)
x∗2 < min
(
b¯t, g
−1(st)
)
otherwise
The value iteration is given by
Vt(st) = Ev sup
b
Eb¯t
[
(v − b)1l{b>b¯t}
+1l{b>b¯t}Vt+1(st − c(st, b))
+1l{b<b¯t}Vt+1(st) | v
]
(31)
Proof. The proof follows as a corollary of result 6.
To complete the value iteration system we choose a terminal payoff VT (s) =
g¯(s).
Result 8 (Non-asymptotic mean-field). Let Fj,t(v) = m¯t(v)+ ǫγj,t(v), where
γj,t(v) =
Fj,t(v)− m¯t(v)
ǫ
,
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m¯t(v) =
1
n
n∑
j′=1
Fj′,t(v),
and
ǫ = max
j
sup
t∈T
sup
[v,v¯]
|Fj,t(v)− m¯t(v)|,
Then, the long-term revenue of the seller R0(s0;F1, . . . , Fn) is in order of
R0(s; m¯, . . . , m¯) +O(ǫ
2) for any n ≥ 2.
Proof. The proof of the first statement is a direct extension of result 3 to the
time space T .
Remark 3. As a consequence of the Result 8, if Fj,t = F
n
j,t depends on n
and satisfies nα(F nj,t−m¯t(v)) ≤ δ for some α > 0 then, the error gap between
the finite regime and the infinite regime in equilibrium is in order of O( 1
n2α
)
which can be very small even for small n but large α.
If nα(F nj,t − m¯t(v)) ≤ δ then the error gap at time t reduces to δt,m¯t,r¯
δ
n2α
and hence the global error in T is at most
δ
n2α
(
sup
t∈T
δt,m¯t,r¯
)
.
Note that is a significant improvement of the mean-field approximation since
the use of mean-field convergence a` la de Finetti [18] gives a convergence
order of O( 1√
n
). The use of the indistinguishability property of the payoff
function helps us to provide a more precise error.
4.5 Scaled auction problem
Using a scaling factor 1
λ
, to the starting state (budget) and horizon, the value
W λ0 (s, T ) := λV0(
s
λ
,
T
λ
),
has a certain limit when λ goes to 0. Let limλW
λ
0 (s, T ) = w(s, T ). Let T
∗ =
inf{t ≥ 0 | st ≤ 0, s0 > 0}. Then, the value w is solution of the following
differential game
w(s, T ) = sup
τ
∫ inf(T ∗,T )
0
Ev,b¯
[
(vt − bt)1l{bt>b¯t}
]
dt
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subject to
s˙t = −Ec(st, bt),
T ∗ = inf{t ≥ 0, | st = 0, s0 > 0}, w(0, T ) = 0 and w(s, 0) = 0. Let r(b) be the
instantaneous payoff from the above formulation. Introduce the Hamiltonian
H¯(s, p) = sup
b
[r(b)− pc(s, b)] ,
The value w satisfies the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation
∂Tw + H¯(s, ∂sw) = 0
4.6 Continuous time game with incomplete informa-
tion
We consider a particular state dynamics given by drift f , independent in-
dividual Brownian motion σi and a common Brownian motion σc. The in-
stantaneous cost is c(t, x, u,m) Define the Hamiltonian as H(t, x, p,m) =
infu{c + 〈p, f〉} and let v(t, x,m) be an equilibrium cost value. Following
[10], the value satisfies

∂tv − (σi + σc)∆xv +H(t, x, ∂xv,m)
+〈∂mv;−(σi + σc)∆xm+ divx(mf(t, x, u∗, m))〉
−σc〈∂2mmv ∂xm; ∂xm〉 + 2σc〈∂m∂xv; ∂xm〉 = 0
v(0, x,m) = g(x,m)
where divx is the divergence operator. Considering n minor players where
the evolution of the measure is now replaced by the evolution of beliefs
in a Bayesian mean field game, the long-term cost function of a player is
R(τ1, . . . , τn) which in order of R(mˆ, . . . , mˆ) + O(ǫ
2) = v(T, x, mˆ) + O(ǫ2)
where mˆ is the average measure (belief). Thus, the non-asymptotic mean
field game approach allows us to understand the behavior of the equilibrium
cost when the players have different beliefs (incomplete information game)
which are near the average belief measure.
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4.7 Extensions
4.7.1 Near-indistinguishable games
In this section we assume that the payoff functions are strictly positive and
satisfy a near-indistinguishability property defined as follows:
Definition 1 (Non-scalable notion). The game G with payoffs rj is near-
indistinguishable if it is ǫ−indistinguishable for a certain small ǫ > 0 i.e.
there exists an indistinguishable function rg such that supa |rj(a)− rg(a)| ≤ ǫ
Definition 2 (Scalable notion). The game G with payoffs rj is scalable near-
indistinguishable if it is ǫ−scalable indistinguishable for a certain small ǫ > 0
i.e. there exists an indistinguishable function rg such that |rj(a) − rg(a)| ≤
ǫ|rg(a)|
The following result follows from the definition of near-indistinguishability.
Result 9. Result 5 extends to near-indistinguishable case with an approxi-
mation given by
rj(a) = rg(a) +O(ǫ1) = r¯(m¯) +O(ǫ1) +O(ǫ
2
2)
for the first type (non-scalable) and
rj(a) = (1± O(ǫ1))rg(a) = (1± O(ǫ1))r¯(m¯) +O(ǫ
2
2)
where ǫ1 comes from the scalable near-indistinguishability error (second type,
scalable notion) and ǫ2 is the heterogeneity gap between action profile a and
m¯.
4.7.2 Discussions
One of the main motivations to study mean field games is the possibility
to reduce the high complexity of interactive dynamical systems into a low-
complexity and easier to solve ones. However, the infinite mean field game
system suggests a continuum of players may not be realistic in many cases
of interests. Then, the question addressed in this paper is to know whether
the mean field game ideas can be used in the finite regime. We show that
the answer is positive for important classes of payoff functions.
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An important statement is that if the asymptotic mean-field system can
reduce the computational complexity then, the same analysis can be con-
ducted in the finite regime. Moreover, the non-asymptotic mean field game
model developed here does not require additional assumptions than the clas-
sical ones (namely A0 and A1) used in asymptotic mean field game theory.
If the indistinguishability assumption fails but still the asymptotic mean
field system is easily solvable then, one can classify the finite system too by
class/and type and hence reduce into a game with less number of classes
(than players) and in each class the indistinguishability property holds. We
refer to such games as indistinguishability per class games. Interestingly our
approximation results extends to near-indistinguishable games as well as to
indistinguishable per class games.
5 Concluding remarks
We have presented a mean field framework where the indistinguishability
property can be exploited to cover not only the asymptotic regime but also
the non-asymptotic regime. In other words, our approximation is suitable
not only for large systems but also for a small system with few players. The
framework can be used to approximate unknown functions in heterogeneous
systems, in optimization theory as well as in game theory.
This work suggests several paths for future research. First, the approach
introduced here can be used in several applications, starting from other
queueing and auctions formats, in particular to private information mod-
els where strategies are functions of types. Second, more progress needs to
be done by considering a less restrictive action and belief spaces that are far
from the mean of the mean field. The smoothness condition on the objective
function may not be satisfied in practice. Finally, we would like to under-
stand how large the deviation of the non-asymptotic result is compared to a
symmetric vector (non-alignment level).
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